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Consumption efficiency hypothesis and the optimality of free trade 
policy in a small open economy 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
It is a standard result of the theory of international trade that free trade is the optimal 
policy for a small open economy which has no influence over the commodity prices in 
the international market. Hence any impediments to free trade e.g. a tariff, a production 
subsidy and/or a consumption tax reduces social welfare by affecting the optimal 
allocation of economic resources and/or by distorting consumers’ choices. The ongoing 
process of trade liberalization is based on this notion of optimality of free trade. 
 
Until the mid 1980s’, the less developed countries (LDCs) followed a stringent trade 
policy and adopted an inward-oriented strategy, making use of discriminating policies 
like tariffs, quotas, restricting free inflow of foreign capital and import of commodities. 
Only since the conclusion of the multilateral agreement and the formation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in the Uruguay round of discussions there have been 
revolutionary changes in liberalizing international trade across countries whether 
developed or developing.  Liberalization involves both inflow of foreign capital as well 
as reduction of protection of domestic industries and integrating the domestic market with 
the world market. The LDCs have been advised by the international institutions like the 
IMF and the World Bank to remove all impediments to free trade as removal of the 
protectionist policy would improve their welfare and take them into higher growth orbits. 
However, despite choosing free trade as their development strategy and drastic 
implementation of trade reforms national income as well as per capita income in most of 
the low income countries as per the World Development Reports (2000/2001, 2006) have 
hardly increased. Besides, the problem of unemployment in the developing countries 
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including the low income countries has increased considerably over the period of 
economic reforms.1  
 
A pertinent question is whether free trade is at all the optimal policy for a poor small 
LDC which is plagued by distortions of different types. The Harris-Todaro (HT, 
hereafter) (1970) model is usually employed in the trade and development literature in 
explaining the problem of unemployment in the LDCs. However, the two-sector mobile 
capital version of the HT model, like that of Corden and Findlay (1975), cannot explain 
as to why national welfare and the unemployment problem in the LDCs have not 
improved following trade liberalization. In that model imposition of a tariff raises the 
return to capital and lowers the rural sector wage following a Stolper-Samuelson effect. 
The aggregate wage income consequently falls2, which lowers social welfare. On the 
other hand, the urban sector expands both in terms of output and employment following a 
Rybczynski type effect that raises the expected urban wage for a prospective rural 
migrant which in turn paves the way for a fresh migration from the rural to the urban 
sector. The level of urban unemployment rises as the number of new migrants exceeds 
the number of new jobs created in the urban sector.  
 
So a theoretical framework is needed that would be able to explain the consequences of 
trade liberalization in the poor small open economies which are consistent with empirical 
findings especially when the standard two-sector mobile capital version of the HT 
framework fails to do so. In the circumstances, the present paper attempts to fill in this 
lacuna of the theoretical literature by embedding the consumption efficiency hypothesis 
in the simple two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. The ‘consumption 
                                                 
1 According to ILO (2007) the unemployment rates in 2006 in the Latin American and Caribbean, 
Sub-Saharan African and South Asian Countries were 8.0, 9.8 and 5.2, respectively. With 
declining employment to population ratios, official unemployment rates increased in most of the 
developing countries over the last two decades. 
 
2 In the HT framework the rural sector wage is the average wage of the workers in the economy. 
This is known as the ‘envelope’ property. So the aggregate wage income of the workers in the 
economy goes up if the rural wage arte rises. 
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efficiency hypothesis’ of Leibenstein (1957, 1958)3 has been widely used in the 
development models for explaining the existence of involuntary unemployment in a poor 
LDC. The basic tenet of the hypothesis is that the nutritional efficiency of a worker is 
positively related to his consumption level at least up to a certain point. Higher 
consumption means higher calorie intake, an increase in body mass, a reduction in 
morbidity as well as greater ability to work.4 There is now considerable evidence5 that in 
a poor LDC with low levels of consumption of the workers there is a significant positive 
relation between workers’ consumption and productivity. Therefore, an increase in the 
consumption level raises the nutritional efficiency i.e. productivity of the worker. Now if 
there is a stable relationship between the consumption level of the worker and his wage 
income then the worker’s productivity is positively linked to the wage that he receives. If 
this is so, then it is in its interest the firm will not offer its profit-maximizing wage but the 
efficiency wage because now the wage through the nutritional efficiency function enters 
into the production function of the firm. The firm minimizes its unit labour cost and it is a 
standard result of this literature that the efficiency wage is set where the elasticity of the 
nutritional efficiency function of the worker is equal to unity. Hence the efficiency wage 
is constant. Even if there is an excess supply of labour at the efficiency wage, the firms 
will have no incentives to lower the wage rate. Hence the labour market does not clear 
and the problem of involuntary unemployment crops up. 
 
However, this theory assumes a one commodity world. But, in a two commodity world 
the nutritional efficiency of a worker may depend on the consumption of one commodity 
only. If the two commodities are food and cloth, then the worker’s nutritional efficiency 
depends only on his consumption of food.  The present paper examines the optimality of 
the free trade policy in a small poor economy incorporating the consumption efficiency 
theory in the simple two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework. It also 
                                                 
3 See also Stiglitz (1976), Mazumdar (1959), Mirrlees (1975), Bliss and Stern (1978) and 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986). 
 
4 One may go through Ray (1993) for the process of efficiency build-up. 
 
5 See Bose (1996) in this context. 
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analyzes the implication of the protectionist policy on unemployment problem in the 
economy.  It finds that free trade may not be the optimal policy for a small open economy 
if the consumption efficiency hypothesis is valid and that the protectionist policy in the 
form of an import tariff may improve social welfare. It also shows that imposition of a 
tariff unambiguously raises the effective employment in the economy. These results are 
new in the literature on trade and development.  
 
2.  The model 
 
Let there be two commodities: X andY . There are L number of homogeneous workers in 
the economy. The worker consumes both commodities but his productivity (nutritional 
efficiency) depends only on the consumption of commodity, X (food). The utility 
function is of the CES type and is given by 
1
(1 )V A x yρ ρ ρδ δ
−
− − = + −   with 0;0 1;  -1< 0 A δ ρ> < < ≠    (1)    
where V , x and y denote the utility level and the consumption levels of X andY , 
respectively. ,A δ and ρ are parameters.δ is the share of commodity X in the consumer’s 
budget while ρ is the substitution parameter.   
 
The budget constraint of the worker (consumer) is 
* (1 )x yP x P y u W+ = −           (2) 
where *,x yP P andW are the two prices and the wage rate, respectively. Finally, u denotes 
the rate of unemployment of labour in the economy. So the right-hand side of (2) is the 
expected wage income of the worker. 
 
Equation (1) is maximized with respect to x and y and subject to (2). Maximization 
exercise leads to the following demand functions for commodities X andY , respectively.6 
                                                 
6 Here the two commodities are gross compliments. In other words, an increase in the price of 
either good lowers the quantities demanded of both the commodities and vice versa. 
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(1 )
(1 )x
u Wx
P Z
−= +           (3)  
[ ]*
(1 )
1 (1/ )y
u Wy
P Z
−= +             (4)  
where
1 *
1 11[( ) ( ) ] 0y
x
P
Z
P
ρ
ρ ρδ
δ
+ +−= >     
The demand for X by each worker in the general form is written as 
*( , , , )x yx x P P W u=           (3.1) 
          (-)(-) (+)(-) 
 
For quite straightforward reasons the demand for X is a negative function of the two 
prices and the unemployment rate while it is a positive function of the wage rate.  
 
The nutritional efficiency of each worker, h , is assumed to be a positive function of his 
consumption level of commodity X and is given by 
* / //[ ( , , , )]; 0; 0x yh h x P P W u h h= > <        (5) 
So h increases at a decreasing rate with an increase in x . 
 
The unit cost of labour,ω , is given by 
W
h
ω =           (6) 
Apart from labour, capital is used in production. Assuming capital to be perfectly mobile 
intersectorally and its uniform return be r economy-wide, each firm minimizes its unit 
labour cost given by (6). The first-order condition of minimization is 
/
3(.) (.)h Wh x=          (7)                                      
where 3 ( / ) 0;x x W= ∂ ∂ > with 33 0x = ; and, 31 32 34, , 0x x x < .7 
It may be checked that the second-order condition is automatically satisfied as // 0h < .  
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix I for the derivations. 
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Equation (7) may be interpreted as follows. The elasticity of the nutritional efficiency 
function (5) is given by 
(( / )( / ))h dh dx x hε =          (8) 
Using (3) and (8), equation (7) can be rewritten as follows. 
1.hε =            (7.1) 
So in equilibrium the efficiency wage is set where the elasticity of the nutritional 
efficiency function is equal to unity. This is a standard result of the efficiency wage 
literature. But unlike the one commodity framework, the condition here does not imply 
the constancy of the wage. It rather implies constancy of the consumption of commodity 
X on which the nutritional efficiency of a worker depends. This establishes the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: In a two-commodity world where the nutritional efficiency of the worker 
depends positively on the consumption of one commodity only, its demand remains 
constant despite changes in the parameters of the system. The nutritional efficiency of the 
worker is also constant. 
 
3.   General equilibrium and the consumption efficiency hypothesis 
 
Let us introduce the nutritional efficiency function into the conventional Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson framework. We consider a small open poor economy with two 
commodities, X andY . There are two inputs of production, labour ( )L and capital ( )K and 
their endowments are given exogenously. Commodity prices, xP and yP , are given by the 
small open economy assumption. Initially there is zero tariff on the import of 
commodityY . The domestic price of commodityY is *( (1 ))y yP P t= + with 0t = .  
Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with positive but diminishing 
marginal productivities to each input. Markets for both commodities and capital are 
perfectively competitive while firms in both sectors set wages in the labour market 
according to equation (7). The total number of workers, L , is fixed in the economy 
although the effective labour force in efficiency unit is (.)h L . Normalizing labour in 
physical unit to unity the economy’s effective labour force is (.).h   
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Given the assumption of perfectly competitive commodity markets the zero-profit 
conditions for the two sectors are as follows. 
Lx Kx x
W a ra P
h
+ =           (9) 
*
Ly Ky y
W a ra P
h
+ =          (10) 
where jia is the amount of the j th input required to produce one unit of output of the i th 
sector for ,j L K= and ,i X Y=  and ( / )W h and r are the wage rate per efficiency unit of 
labour and the return to capital, respectively. Sector X is more labour-intensive than 
sectorY i.e. ( ) 0Lx Ky Kx Lyθ θ θ θ θ= − > where jiθ is the distributive share of the j th input in 
the i th sector.  
 
Capital is fully utilized in the two sectors. The full-employment condition for capital is 
given by 
Kx Kya X a Y K+ =          (11) 
where X andY are the levels of output in the two sectors.  
 
There is unemployment of labour in the economy and the rate of unemployment is .u  
The labour endowment equation is, therefore, given by 
(1 )Lx Lya X a Y h u+ = −          (12) 
The effective employment of labour in the economy, E , is 
(1 )E h u= −           (13) 
 
The general equilibrium system consists of equations (5), (7) and (9) – (13). The 
endogenous variables are: , , , ,W h r u X ,Y and E . If we look at the structure we find 
that , ,W h r andu are determined from (5), (7), (9) and (10). Once h andu are determined 
the effective employment of labour, E  is also obtained from (13). So factor prices, 
nutritional efficiency of worker, the unemployment rate and the effective employment of 
labour in the economy depend on commodity prices but not on factor endowments. 
Finally, X andY are obtained from (11) and (12). 
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4.  Comparative statics 
 
We are now going to analyze the consequences of tariff protection of sectorY on the 
endogenous variables. We consider an increase in t  by 0dt > . Totally differentiating 
equations (5), (7), (9) and (10) the following results can be obtained. 
( / ) 0dh dt =           (14) 
( / ) 0;( / ) 0dW dt dr dt< >         (15) 
 
So imposition of an import tariff on commodityY raises the return to capital and lowers 
the wage rate following the Stolper-Samuelson effect as sectorY is relatively capital-
intensive.8  
 
The result given by (14) has already been stated in proposition 1. As the consumption of 
commodity X is independent of commodity prices (and other parameters) the efficiency 
of the worker does not change following the imposition of a tariff. 
 
Totally differentiating (5), (7), (9) and (10) and then (13) the following results can be 
obtained.9 
( / ) 0;du dt < and, ( / ) 0.dE dt >        (16) 
These lead to the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: A tariff lowers the unemployment rate and raises the economy-wide 
effective employment of labour unambiguously.  
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. An increase in the tariff, t , 
by 0dt >  on sectorY raises the domestic price of commodity Y i.e. (1 )yP t+ . It lowers the 
demand for X (i.e. x ) as commodities are gross compliments. The wage rate per 
                                                 
8 Actually, the efficiency wage, ( / )W hω = decreases following the Stolper-Samuelson effect. 
But as the nutritional efficiency of the workers, h , does not change a decrease inω implies a fall 
in the wage rate per worker, .W  
 
9 See Appendix II for detailed derivations. 
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worker,W , falls as sectorY is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector X which in turn 
lowers the demand for X . There are two negative effects on x when t  rises. However, 
from proposition 1 we find that the net effect of any parameter changes on the demand 
for commodity X must be zero. Therefore, so as to neutralize the negative effects of an 
increase in t  on x , the unemployment rate,u , must fall which raises the demand for good 
X by increasing the expected wage income of the worker.  
 
As the nutritional efficiency, h , of each worker remains unchanged despite an increase in 
the tariff rate, t , (see proposition 1), the effect of a change in t on the economy’s effective 
employment level depends solely on how the increase in the tariff rate affects the 
unemployment rate,u . Asu falls following an increase in t , the economy-wide effective 
employment, E , rises as t  rises. 
 
We are now going to analyze the consequences of tariff protection of the import-
competing sector on the welfare of the economy. The demand side of the model is 
represented by a quasi-concave social utility function. Let I  denote the social utility that 
depends on the consumption demands for the two commodities denoted by, XD and YD . 
Thus, it is shown as 
( , )x yI I D D=                  .                                (17) 
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that 
x x y y x yP D P D P X P Y+ = +             (18) 
or equivalently, 
* *
x x y y x y yP D P D P X P Y tP M+ = + +                     (18.1) 
 
The demand for the importables (commodityY ) and the volume of import are given by 
the following two equations, respectively. 
*( , , )y y x yD D P P N=                                                                                                          (19) 
              (−) (−) (+) 
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*( , , )y x yM D P P N Y= −                                                                                                     (20) 
where the national income of the economy at domestic prices, N , is given by 
*
x y yN P X P Y tP M= + +                                                                            (21) 
or equivalently, 
(1 ) YN W u rK tP M= − + +                                                                                            (21.1)  
where (1 )Wh u− and rK are the aggregate wage income and rental income on capital, 
respectively. Finally, YtP M measures the tariff revenue collected by the government and 
transferred to the consumers as lump sum payments. With 0,t = YtP M is equal to zero.   
 
Differentiating equations (17), (18.1), (20), (21.1) and using the expression 
for ( / )dE dt the following proposition can be established.10                      
  
Proposition 3: A tariff protection of the import-competing sector improves social 
welfare unequivocally if 0t =  initially. Social welfare may improve if initially 0.t >  
  
Proposition 3 is interesting as it states that free trade may not be the optimal policy for a 
small poor open economy. This result can be explained in the following fashion. If 0t =  
initially there will be only one effect. As the unemployment rate falls and the economy-
wide effective employment of labour rises there will be an increase in the aggregate wage 
income. Social welfare, therefore, improves unambiguously. On the other hand, when 
0t >  initially, the aggregate factor income rises. This also raises the demand for the 
importables and hence the tariff revenue given the production of commodityY . These 
two effects work favourably on national welfare. On the other hand, as the domestic price 
ofY rises, the import-competing sector expands and also the demand for the importables 
falls. These two factors tend to lower the import demand and hence the tariff revenue. So 
an increase in the domestic price of Y exert downward pressure on welfare as it leads to 
misallocation of economic resources from the export sector to the import-competing 
sector and also affects the consumers’ choices. So both the supply side and demand side 
                                                 
10 This has been proved in Appendix III. 
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distortionary costs of tariff increase. These two effects work negatively on welfare. So 
there are four effects on welfare in total. If the sum of the first two positive effects 
dominates over the combined magnitude of the other two, social welfare improves.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has examined the validity of the proposition as to whether free trade is the 
optimal policy for a poor small open economy by incorporating the consumption 
efficiency hypothesis in the simple two-sector general equilibrium model. The nutritional 
efficiency of the workers depends on the consumption of one commodity only although 
they consume both the commodities. In this setup the implications of the protectionist 
policy on the economy-wide effective employment of labour and on welfare have been 
studied. It has been found that the imposition of a tariff on the capital-intensive import-
competing sector not only raises the effective employment of the economy but also may 
produce favourable effect on social welfare. If the initial tariff rate is zero, then a tariff 
unambiguously improves social welfare by raising the effective employment. So this 
theoretical analysis justifies the desirability of retaining some degree of protection in the 
poor open economies from the view points of both welfare and unemployment problem. 
These results are interesting also as these are completely opposite to what are obtained in 
the standard two-sector mobile capital HT model like that of Corden and Findlay (1975).  
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Appendix I: 
 
The problem of the consumer is as follows:    
   
1
 (1 ) ;
,
Max V A x y
x y
ρ ρ ρδ δ
−
− − = + −      (A>0; 0<δ <1;  -1< ρ ≠ 0  )   (1) 
subject to  * (1 )x yP x P y u W+ = −                     (2)                                     
 
The first-order condition is 
1
*
1( ) ( )( )x
y
Py
x P
ρ δ
δ
+ −=          (A.1) 
Solving (A.2) and (A.3) the optimum demand for good X is obtained as follows. 
(1 )
(1 )x
u Wx
P Z
−= +           (3) 
where: 
1 *
1 11[( ) ( ) ] 0y
x
P
Z
P
ρ
ρ ρδ
δ
+ +−= >        (A.2)         
In general form the demand for X by each worker is written as 
*( , , , )x yx x P P W u=           (3.1) 
 
Differentiating (3) the following results are obtained. 
1
[1 ]
1( ) 0
(1 )x x
Z
xx x
P P Z
ρ+∂ += = − <∂ + ; 2 * *( ) ( ) 0;(1 ) 1y y
x xZx
P P Z
ρ
ρ
∂ −= = <∂ + +        
3
(1 )( ) 0;
(1 )x
x ux
W P Z
∂ −= = >∂ + 4 ( ) 0;(1 )x
x Wx
u P Z
∂ −= = <∂ +  
2
31
[1 ]
1( ) 0;
(1 )x x
Z
xx x
W P P Z W
ρ+∂ += = − <∂ ∂ +
2
33 2( ) 0;
xx
W
∂= =∂     (A.3) 
2
32 * *( ) ( )( ) 0;1 1y y
x x Zx
W P WP Z
ρ
ρ
∂ −= = <∂ ∂ + +
2
34
1( ) 0;
(1 )x
xx
W u P Z
∂= = − <∂ ∂ +             
2 32( ) 0x Wx− = ;  1 31( ) 0x Wx− = ; 4 34( ) 0x Wx− =  
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Appendix II: 
         
 
Totally differentiating equations (9), (10), (5) and (7) and writing in a matrix notation one 
gets the following. 
  
3 3 4
2 // 2 //
3 3 4
0
0
0
0 0
Lx Lx Kx
Ly Ly Ky
Wx Wx x u
W h x uWh x x
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
−  −  − −  
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
h
W
r
u
       
=
2
//
3 2
0
( )
( )
y
y
dt
P x dt
P Wh x x dt
     −  
    (A.4) 
 Solving (A.4) and simplifying one gets the following expressions. 
( ) 0dh
dt
=           (A.5)    
3 2
4
ˆ ( )[ ]Kx y
dtu Wx P x
ux
θ θθ= − <0       (A.6) 
             (-)              (+)                                             
ˆ 0KxW dtθθ= − <          (A.7) 
ˆ 0Lxr dtθθ= >           (A.8) 
where: ( ) 0Lx Ky Kx Lyθ θ θ θ θ= − > .       (A.9)  
(as sector X is more labour-intensive relative to sectorY )                                     
 
Now we recall equation (13) 
(1 )E h u= −           (13) 
Differentiating (13), using (A.5) and (A.6) and simplifying the following expression is 
obtained. 
3 2
4
ˆ ( )( )[ ] 0
1 Kx y
u dtE Wx P x
u ux
θ θθ= − − >−               (A.11)    
                           (-)     (+)           (+)(-)                      
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Appendix III: 
 
Differentiating (17) and (18.1) we get the following two expressions, respectively. 
2
1 1
( )x y
IdI dD dD
I I
= + = *1 [ ]x x y y
x
P dD P dD
P
+       (A.12)      
* *
x x y y x y yP dD P dD P dX P dY tP dM+ = + +       (A.13)   
 
Differentiating the expression for national income at domestic prices, given by (21) one 
obtains 
* *
x y y y ydN P dX P dY YdP tP dM P Mdt= + + + +       (A.14)                   
 
By differentiating production functions and considering (11) and (12) we have 
 
* *[ ] [ ( ) ( )]x x y yx y x L x K x y L y K yP dX P dY P F dL F dK P F dL F dK+ = + + +   
[(( / ) ) (( / ) )]x x y yW h dL rdK W h dL rdK= + + + ( / )( ) ( / )x yW h dL dL W h dE= + =  (A.15) 
[Note that from (11) and (12) ( ) 0x ydK dK+ = ; and,[( ) ( / ) ]x ydL dL W h dE+ = . iji FP  is the 
value of marginal product of the j th factor in the i th sector, which is equal to the factor price.] 
 
Using (A.15), equation (A.14) is rewritten as follows. 
[ ( )]y y
WdN dE P D dt tdM
h
= + +        (A.16) 
 
Differentiating (20) one gets         
*
*
y y
y
y
D D
dM dP dN dY
P N
∂ ∂= + −∂ ∂        (A.17)                                
Using (A.16), equation (A.17) can be rewritten as follows. 
*
* [ ( )]
y y
y y y
y
D D WdM dP dE P D dt tdM dY
P N h
∂ ∂= + + + −∂ ∂  
          = [ ]yy
DWV HP dt dY dE
h N
∂− + ∂       (A.18)                          
where: (1 ) 0
1 (1 )
tV
t m
+= >+ − ; 
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*( )yy
D
m P
N
∂= ∂  is the marginal propensity to consume commodity Y.  
H= *( )
y
y
y
DDy D
P N
∂∂ +∂ ∂ is the Stutsky’s pure substitution term; and, 0.H <  
Using (A.12), (A.13) and (A.18) and simplifying we get 
 
1
1 ( ) [ (1 ) ( ) { }]y y
x x
PdI W dE dYTmV t V HP
I dt hP dt P dt
= + + −      (A.19)                        
Now if 0t =  initially, (A.19) reduces to 
1
1 ( ) [( )( )]
x
dI W dE
I dt hP dt
=                    (A.19.1) 
Using (A.11), (A.19.1) can be rewritten as follows. 
3 2
1 4
1 ( ) ( )( ) 0.Kx y
x
dI W Wx P x
I dt x P
θ θθ
−= − >          
                 (+)(-)        (+)           (+)(-)                  
